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Okeke: A Note on the Right of Secession

A NOTE ON THE RIGHT OF
SECESSION AS A HUMAN RIGHT*
CHRIS N. OKEKE"

I. THE RIGHT TO SECEDE AS A PEOPLE'S RIGHT

Alexander Martinenko's article, "The Right Of Secession As
A Human Right," is certainly a commendable and bold attempt
by an international legal scholar from the former Soviet bloc to
tackle a subject of such unprecedented controversy in internationallaw. The debate as to whether the principle of self-determination is a right in international law, or simply a principle
of political thought, has assumed great prominence in international affairs at various periods since the eighteenth century.
For a long time after the end of World War II, it remained the
most controversial issue in international law. However, the
principle of self-determination is now firmly established as a
right exercisable by all peoples under international law. This
brief note is not intended to chronicle the development of the
concept of self-determination. The history of the right of selfdetermination may be found elsewhere. 1 Rather, this note
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both of Golden Gate University School of Law.
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1. Ian Brownlie, An Essay in History of the Principle of Self-determination,
GROTIAN SOCIETY PAPERS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LAw OF NATIONS, 1968
(Charles Henry Alexandrowicz ed., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1970); RUPPERT
EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NATION: THE RISE TO SELF-ASSERTION OF AsIAN AND
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examines first, the conditions that give rise to secession; next,
the old and new normative framework and constitutional law
and the attitude of states to secession; arguments for and
against secession and new trends on the issue of secession; and
the practical significance of the provision of the right of secession in the constitutions of the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (hereinafter U.S.S.R.), and the provision of the right
to secession in the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic
(hereinafter U.R.).

II. BASIS OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS
Since 1945, the world has witnessed the rejection normatively and practically of colonialism and other forms of alien
domination and control. Contemporary international normative
systems, with few exceptions, frown upon secession, yet separatist movements persist. Indeed, they have become a permanent feature of the contemporary world scene. The reasons for
their persistence deserve our closest attention.
According to Alexis Heraclides, for a successful secessionist
movement to occur, three elements must be present. First,
there must exist a community or a society that is a self-defined
human collectivity (an "ingroup") which is distinguishable and
dichotomizes itself from the Center (the "outgroup,,).2 Second,
there should be an actual or at least a perceived, present, past,
or future inequality or disadvantage in the existing unified
state. 3 Lastly, there must exist territorial contiguity, that is, a
distinct and integral territory in which ingroup habitation
manifests a discernible degree of compactness over a period of
time. 4 Only if all three coexist can a fully-fledged and legitimized separatist movement emerge. The three attitudes interact to defuse or reinforce each other. 5
AFRICAN PEOPLES (Harvard University Press 1960); A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff 1973); ALFRED
COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION (rev. ed., London:
Collins 1969); U.O. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw
(Hamden: Archon 1972).
2. See ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Frank Cass 1991).
3. [d. at 196.

4. [d ..
5. All secessionist territories have an international border or an outlet to the
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Secessions have sprung from separate communities, that
is, from groups with an ascriptive basis, 6 as well as from societies which are separate from the community or society at the
Center. Two principal types of separatist societies are known
to have emerged on the international scene: those which have
a distinct history of separate administration from the Center,
and those whose secession would split a nation into two. 7 The
more a group within a distinct territory nears the point of
being considered an ethnic group or nation, the lesser the
weight in justifying secession is placed on inequality, or to put
it differently, the lesser the required degree of inequality.8
Conversely, the more the group lacks ethnic identity, the greater the required degree ofinequality.9

III. OLD AND NEW FRAMEWORK
The perplexing irony about the normative basis of secession is that the very norm - the principle of self-determination,
developed during the late 1950s and 1960s, and which secessionist movements invoke in support of their goal - is the main
legal bulwark against secession.
The United Nations Charter refers to self-determination as
a principle in Articles 1(2)10 and 55. 11 A series of other U.N.
sea which allows them to seek sanctuary, access, and establish arms routes. Rarely have the neighboring state(s) assisted the Central Government militarily.
6. There are five types of categories used for identifying the ascriptive basis
of a community. These are: 1) ethno-national identity (formed on the basis of language), 2) national identity (in which the basis is not linguistic), 3) religious identity, 4) racial identity, and 5) sub-ethnic or "tribal" identity.
7. It is the precise political situation which lends salience to one or the other
separate identity and to its endurance. For example, the ethno-nations like the
Iraqi Kurds and the Karens of Myanmar claim to have maintained the "longest
secessionist war." There are, however, groups with an attenuated (if any) ascriptive identity, such as the Southern Sudanese, as well as groups with a common
ascriptive identity, such as the Eritreans.
8. HERACLIDES, supra note 2, at 197.
9. [d ..

10. One of the purposes of the United Nations noted in Article 1(2) is to "de_
velop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace." See U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2).
11. Article 55 reads in part:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
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General Assembly Resolutions has been passed to elaborate
these articles still further. Six years earlier, in 1960, came the
trail-blazer of the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions - the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 12 which acknowledged the "right" of "all peoples" to self-determination. However, the U.N. Declaration on
the Principles' of Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
Nations in 1970 rejected any right of secession from an independent state and condemns "any action aimed at the partial
or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other state or country.,,13
If self-determination refers to "the freedom of a people to
choose its government and institutions and to control its own
resources," there seems to be a striking contradiction between
the right of "all peoples" to self-determination and the right of
a state to its "territorial integrity," the latter precluding secession. This contradiction is also apparent from the U.N. prescriptions and practice in regard to self-determination as well
as in the practice of states. 14

Constitutional law of states has been equally adverse to
secession as a matter of international law. A very limited number of post-World War II national constitutions has recognized
a right of secession. Examples of constitutions that recognize
this right of secession include the Burmese Constitution, which
at the same time provided alinost insurmountable rules of
procedure and, not surprisingly, did not afford such a right to
the three regional states most likely to seek independence, i.e.,
the Shan, the Karen, and the Kachin states. 15 The Constiturelations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the
United Nations shall promote . . . . (ellipsis added).
See U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
12. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
N4684 (1960).
13. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. N8028
(1960). Such paragraphs are not unusual in other U.N. General Assembly Resolutions.
14. CHRIS N. OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 176 (Rotterdam University Press 1974). The cases of Bangladesh and
Biafra were studies in which inconsistencies in state practice as well as the U.N.
were very clearly illustrated. For details see generally OKEKE supra, at 131-177.
15. Joseph Silverstein, Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession
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tion of the former Yugoslavia recognized the right of secession. 16 It stipulated that self-determination included secession
but stated unambiguously that territorial revisions were possible only with the consent of all six Republics and the autonomous provinces. 17 The Constitution of the former U.S.S.R.
granted under its Article 72 "the right freely to secede" to each
Union Republic. Needless to say, that right was never allowed
to be taken up by any of the Republics before the collapse of
the Union. When invoked by Georgia and other Union Republics in the early days of the Russian Revolution, it was rejected. 1s Even most recently, the Chechnian bid to secede from
the Russian Federation has led to gruesome war that is still
taking a heavy toll in deaths on both sides and threatens the
future of the Federated Russian Republic.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECESSION
A number of specific arguments has been advanced over
the years against secession. Some of these arguments are
strictly legal or legalistic while others are non-legal. These
arguments have been comprehensively summarized by Lee C.
Buchheit. 19 The strictly legal or legalistic arguments against
secession include the following:
1. The right of self-determination can only be exercised

once on the basis of the maxim pacta sunt servanda;
2. International law is the law of states and not of peoples
or individuals. States are the subjects of international law and
peoples (majorities or minorities) are the objects of that law;
and

from the Union of Burma, 18 J. ASIAN STUD. 43-57 (1958).
16. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro
have arisen from the disintegration of the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
17. YUGOSLAV CONST. prmbL and art. 5 (3).
18. The origins of the secession clause in the former Soviet Constitution are
based on Vladmir Ilich Lenin's approach to self-determination (in contrast with the
more orthodox standpoint on the subject).
19. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SESESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
(New Haven 1978).
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3. The so-called argument based on mutuality, i.e., as
states cannot oust one of their provinces, equally a province
cannot secede.
All the arguments enumerated above are rebuttable. The
Latin maxim rebus sic stantibus 20 can be appropriately used
to deal with the first. The second argument has suffered heavy
criticisms by eminent international lawyers in modern times.
The view that states are the only subjects of international law
can no longer be maintained in contemporary international
law. 21 The third argument ignores the possibility of population transfers or cession of territories without a plebiscite, as
in the cases of Eritrea and West New Guinea. 22
Buchheit's summary of even more substantial non-legal
arguments against secession includes:
1. The fear of balkanization, the domino theory, or the
specter of the Pandora's Box;
2. The fear of indefinite divisibility, because very few
states are ethnically homogeneous, nor often are secessionist
territories themselves;
3. The fear of the effect such a right could have on the
democratic system, by providing a minority with an opportunity for continual blackmail, threatening to secede if there is no
conformity with its wishes;
4. The danger of giving birth to non-viable and particularly small entities which would rely on extensive international
aid;

20. The clause stands for "provided that things stand as they were."
21. For a comprehensive discussion of subjects of international law, see OKEKE,
supra note 14, at 9-124. See also CHRIS N. OKEKE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw IN NIGERIA (Enugu 1986). The view of states being only subjects of international law can no longer stand for it has difficulty in accommodating the international law of human rights and cases of international criminality.
22. HERACLIDES, supra note 2.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol3/iss1/4

6

Okeke: A Note on the Right of Secession

1996]

A NOTE ON THE RIGHT OF SECESSION

33

5. The fear of trapped minorities within the seceding state
who presumably cannot each secede in turn; and
6. The fear of stranded majorities in cases where the
seceding territory is economically or strategically crucial to the
original state. 23
The case for a right of secession has hardly ever been presented as an unqualified right for anyone who claims it. It has
rather been a call for the articulation of adequate criteria, or
standards of legitimacy, whereby only legitimate claims to
secession would fall within the scope of the self-determination
principle. 24
It is the considered opmIOn of this note, as earlier expressed,25 that the demands of self-determination must in the
last resort be placed above the needs for "territorial integrity"
and "non-interventionist" stands taken by the United Nations.
But, the question is largely one of timing. Under certain circumstances a claim to self-determination, even in a non-colonial setting, may be valid under international law. Third states
must recognize and appreciate the concurrence of two competing international personalities. 26 They should refrain from
giving support to either of them, precisely because both of
them enjoy international personality and as such should be
protected by international law. If an insurrectionist movement
has acquired sufficient force and stability to call for a recognition of its character as a movement of genuine self-determination - which is not to say recognition of the insurgent authority
as a government as such - other States are entitled, even
bound, to recognize and deal with the insurgent element qua
belligerent, though not necessarily as a recognized government.
It is essential to recognize the legitimacy of its aim if it appears that it can achieve it, and if its status as a regular belligerent is apparent.

23. BUCCHEIT, supra note 19, at 20·30.
24. HERACLIDES, supra note 2, at 29.
25. OKEKE, supra note 14, at 177.

26. Id ..
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Secession can be tolerated only as the ultimate remedy in
a situation of marked oppression. This line of thought is not
new. It appeared as early as the 1920's in the Aalands Island
case, known then as carence de souverainete, and applied to
territories which were so "badly misgoverned" that they became totally alienated from the metropolitan state. 27 Beitz
argues that secessionist self-determination can be justified if
the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of a region favor
it and if independent statehood is a necessary condition for the
attainment of justice. 28
V. CONCLUSION
As matters stand today, secessionist independence can be
achieved mainly if there is total military intervention on the
part of a third state which has the power of defeating or otherwise neutralizing the Center. Under present conditions, attracting a large-scale intervention, such as occurred in the
India-Bangladesh case, is highly improbable. The best a secessionist movement can realistically hope for is some measure of
autonomy or federated status in which there is adequate constitutional guarantee for a good degree of power-sharing with
the Center.
What is clear is that the time for secessionist states in the
international arena appears to have arrived. A case in point is
the breakup of the former Soviet Union earlier mentioned. As
a first case for post-colonial Mrica, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia and in 1993 became an independent state. The breakup of
the former Yugoslavia is still fresh. Until Eritrea's recent success in its secessionist war against Ethiopia, prevailing state
ideology in Mrica treated as treason any discussion or movement about border changes, separatist movements, or ethnic
self-determination within an independent Mrican State. 29

27. M. Crawford Young, Nationalism and Separatism in Africa, NEW STATES IN
THE MODERN WORLD 60-67 (Martin Kilson ed., Cambridge 1975).
28. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 112115 (Princeton 1979).
29. For a journalistic account of the recent creation of mini-states through the
breakup of larger entities, see Russell Warren Howe, Countries are Breaking into
Mini-states and That's Not Necessarily Bad, BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 1994, at E8.
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These recent events should set the people of Africa thinking on how best to address the problem of determining the
"self' which would possess the right to self-determination and
how the will of that "self' should be determined. Unfortunately, identifying these criteria will be especially difficult because,
according to Mutua, "the colonial state substantially changed
social relations and created new alliances and interests not in
existence in the pre-colonial era."30
One outstanding contrast emerges from reading
Martinenko's article. The practical significance of the provision
of the right of secession in the U.R. Constitution, as was provided in the Constitution of the former U.S.S.R., which is
worth remembering, is that at least on paper, one model regards secessionist self-determination as legitimate, while another model such as the United States and Australia views it
as unconstitutional and reserves for the federal union the
sovereign authority to quell any secessionist movement.
In the final analysis, there seems to be a good case for the
qualified exceptional right to secessionist self-determination
and it ought not to be rejected outright when a separatist plea
is particularly sound. Not to recognize that there can be cases
of well-founded secessionist pleas is not only to turn a deaf ear
to living reality, but also a blind eye to the conceptual deficiency of the old normative framework on the question. It is time
to listen with open eyes and minds.

30. Mukau Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J, INT'L L. 1113, 1176 (1995).
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